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This paper critically examines the neglected importance of employee conformity in or-
ganisations. More specifically, it addresses the ways in which coercive persuasion can 
manufacture conformity through contemporary leadership processes and corporate cul-
ture practices.  Drawing on the foundational work of Schein (1961), we illustrate how 
the nine techniques of coercive persuasion that he identified can serve as a framework 
for understanding the exercise of power and the manufacture of conformity in modern 
organisations. In particular, we discuss this framework in relation to the phenomenon of 
‘corporate culturalism’ (in which powerful leaders determine constraining norms and val-
ues for others, in the form of compelling ideologies). We argue that ideology, when em-
braced with sufficient vigour, can function as an invisible internal eye, ensuring that sub-
jects themselves become the instruments of their own subjugation. The paper concludes 
by discussing the implications of coercive persuasion in organisational discourse. 
key words: Coercive persuasion; employee conformity; power and ideology
‘Management has to unite the organisation around a strong idea, a shared vision, and 
then manage accordingly. That makes tough demands. In the company of the future 
there will only be space for believers. Dissenters must look elsewhere.’ (Kunde and Cun-
ningham, Corporate Religion, 2000)
INTRODUCTION
Today’s organisations are marked by the steady accumulation of pow-
er on the part of corporations and senior executives (Guthey, 2005; 
Starbuck, 2003; Haigh, 2003), power that is often exercised through 
coercive control mechanisms (Tracy, Lutgen-Sandvik, and Alberts, 
2006) designed to ensure conformity (Tourish and Pinnington, 2002). 
Although we are confronted almost daily by examples of the negative 
consequences of coercion, we see a key contemporary concern lying 
with coercion’s more subtle side.  Coercive persuasion refers to the 
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ways in which we socially construct discursive systems of constraint 
that are difficult to challenge and resist as seen in such examples as 
Barker’s (1993) tightly controlled teamwork environments, the tragically 
flawed decision-making on the part of Morton-Thiokol executives lead-
ing up to the Challenger disaster (Starbuck and Milliken, 1988; Tomp-
kins, 1993) and the disciplinary processes within Enron that demon-
strate how excessive levels of conformity and compliance can have 
dysfunctional and even dangerous consequences for organisations 
(Tourish and Vatcha 2005). While there has been some critical ques-
tioning of this growing coercive force of corporate power in our lives 
(e.g. Mintzberg, 2004; Lipman-Blumen, 2005, 2007), scholars have yet 
to explain fully the processes whereby unchallenged coercive persua-
sion becomes manifest in the daily lives of subordinates, followers and/
or employees. 
This paper explores the key dynamics of coercive persuasion and con-
textualizes these dynamics within modern corporate culturalism, one 
of its strongest manifestations.  We begin by exploring coercive per-
suasion as a concept and situate its roots in contemporary theories of 
power, conformity, and leadership. The article draws on Schein’s (1961) 
foundational work on coercive persuasion to develop a framework for 
describing and assessing the techniques of coercive persuasion that 
often shape conformity in organisational practice. We then discuss vari-
ous effects and consequences of coercive persuasion from the stand-
point of modern corporate culturalism and describe the implications of 
our analysis for future research.
Current Perspectives on Leadership, Power, and Con-
formity
The issue of conformity and its relationship to leadership is relatively 
under-examined in the literature. Some social psychological studies of 
leadership do address leaders’ attempts to secure followers’ conform-
ity, but these tend to be rather uncritical, often taking for granted the 
desirability of followers’ conformity. Typically, such studies argue that 
leaders influence followers’ identity as an indirect means of increasing 
their commitment (Chemers, 2003). Scholars, informed by the transfor-
mational leadership literature in particular, suggest that leaders need to 
satisfy followers’ needs, values, and goals and confirm their identities 
(Burns, 1978; Bass, 1985; Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999), in order to ef-
fect a change of attitudes generally assumed to reflect a common inter-
est (Shamir et al, 1993). Within such approaches, legitimacy derives 
from the assumption that management action is inherently rational, 
such that ‘The interests of the organisation and those of management 
are seen to be largely coterminous’ (Gordon et al., 2009: 16). Similarly, 
Lord and Brown (2001, 2004) define leadership as a social process 
through which leaders change the way followers envision themselves. 
They recommend that leaders should link motivation and reward to fol-
lowers’ identities, ‘activating’ the appropriate self rather than directly 
stressing specific goals. 
Few studies in this tradition explicitly recognize that unquestioning con-
formity can have harmful consequences1. Seeking to prescribe and im-
1.  Hogg (2004) is one of the few writers in this 
tradition to problematize conformity in organi-
sations.
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prove leaders’ control practices, these writers generally subscribe to a 
rather uncritical view of organisational power relations. They assume 
that power is always associated with coercion and differentiate this 
from leadership, which they typically define as an influence process 
that mobilises others towards the attainment of collective goals. Un-
derstanding leadership as a positive process of disproportionate social 
influence (e.g. Shamir, 1999), they distinguish between influence (in 
which followership is voluntary) and power (in which followers are co-
erced into compliance or obedience). Consequently such studies rarely 
examine follower conformity or the coercive and disciplinary aspects of 
leadership practices. Indeed, much of the leadership literature fails to 
address the issue of power at all, particularly at what is termed a ‘deep 
structure’ level (Gordon, 2002). Again, studies focusing on transfor-
mational leadership tend to under-theorise the role of dissent (Tourish 
and Pinnington, 2002), under-estimate the importance of followership 
(Grint, 2005) and encourage an environment in which narcissism rath-
er than effective leadership thrives (Maccoby, 2003). 
By contrast, more critical writers on organisations treat power as an 
embedded, structural and pervasive feature of organisations (Barker, 
1993; Zoller and Fairhurst, 2007). Drawing on Foucault’s (1977, 1979) 
ideas in particular, they conceive of certain forms of power as also be-
ing positive, productive, and creative, since they are ‘aimed at prohibit-
ing undesirable behaviors and promoting desirable behaviors’ (Sewell 
and Barker, 2006: 935). Accordingly, these writers question the separa-
tion between power and influence, and the assumption underpinning 
it according to which power is inherently negative and coercive. From 
this more critical perspective, influence is one form of (leaders’) power. 
Accordingly, the foregoing recommendation that leaders should try to 
influence followers’ identity illustrates the very disciplinary processes 
that more critical leadership writers seek to analyse (Collinson, 2005, 
2006). 
A questioning approach to workplace power relations has long been a 
central concern of critical organisation studies (Hardy and Clegg, 1999). 
Contemporary contributions have tended to focus specifically on the 
inter-relationships between control and resistance. A recent special is-
sue of Organisation, for example, highlights the continued importance 
of the ‘control-resistance dualism’ within contemporary organisations, 
revealing how control strategies can produce forms of resistance de-
signed to re-affirm employee identities (Delbridge and Ezzamel, 2005). 
Critical studies have demonstrated that employee resistance can take 
various forms, from output restriction and foot-dragging to sabotage, 
whistle blowing, and strikes (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Fleming 
and Spicer, 2003). However, we see a tendency for this literature to 
focus too narrowly on the relationship between control and resistance2. 
One effect is that important additional questions like employee com-
mitment, conformity and compliance can be precluded from serious 
consideration. Equally, while identity is often associated with resist-
ance (as Delbridge and Ezzamel assert), the concern to construct and 
protect self is frequently embedded in practices of conformity and com-
pliance too, as we elaborate below.
2.  In the same special issue of Organisation, 
Townley (2005) criticises the tendency to re-
duce organisational processes to the control-
resistance dualism because this creates ‘a 
totalitarian vision’ in which ‘not only is every-
thing control, but also everything is resistance.’ 
(2005: 645).
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Hence, while the mainstream leadership literature is rather uncritical in 
its treatment of conformity in organisations, the more critical literature 
has tended to neglect conformity in favour of a recent focus on the inter-
relationship between control and resistance. Against this background, 
we seek to develop a more critical analysis of both the ways in which 
conformity can be manufactured in organisations (through particular 
leadership practices) and the potentially detrimental consequences of 
such processes. The Nazi extermination of six million Jews and the 
explanation offered by those involved that they were simply ‘obeying or-
ders’ serves as a stark reminder of the potential dangers of conformity. 
Accordingly, we draw inspiration from earlier classic works on conform-
ity, especially that of Milgram (1974), whose experiments highlighted 
people’s willingness to obey authority, and Fromm (1941), who pointed 
to ‘the fear of freedom’, whereby individuals try to shelter in the per-
ceived security of being told what to do and think, viewing this apparent 
security as a less threatening alternative to the responsibility of making 
decisions for themselves. 
Coercive Power and Coercive Persuasion
To develop further our conceptualisation of coercive persuasion within 
contemporary organisations, we draw on the renowned work of Schein 
(1961) to describe how corporate leaders may construct a social envi-
ronment that coercively channels the physical, intellectual and emotion-
al energies of employees towards conformity. We begin by differentiat-
ing between coercive persuasion and coercive power, the latter simply 
relying on the forced compliance of subjects to decreed organisational 
norms (‘come to work on time tomorrow or you are sacked’). We assert 
that coercive persuasion, on the other hand, encourages subjects to 
internalise dominant cultural norms as their own, subsequently produc-
ing individuals deemed to be ‘appropriate’ by the ruling group (Alvesson 
and Willmott, 2002) while disguising many of the elements of compul-
sion that are involved, even from those directly affected (Tompkins and 
Cheney, 1985).
Weber (1978) famously characterised rule based and rational control 
as an ‘iron cage’, tightly controlling forms of behaviour. Foucault (1977) 
discussed the notion of a Panopticon: a model for a prison in which the 
threat of constant and inescapable surveillance was sufficient to condi-
tion the behaviour of inmates in ‘desirable’ directions, replacing exclu-
sive reliance on rules and bureaucracy3.  As many have suggested, the 
notion of a perfect Panopticon is illusory: there is always some means of 
avoiding total surveillance.  Resistance to control has been document-
ed in many seemingly all powerful contexts (Simon, 2005). In addition, 
Foucault was most concerned by how the process of external observa-
tion compelled the adoption of centrally sanctioned behavioural norms, 
particularly since inmates could never be certain when they were being 
observed. This uncertainty required consistent conformity as observed 
‘deviancy’ could attract punishment from the unseen observer.  
From the perspective of coercive persuasion, Foucault’s (1991) no-
tion of ‘governmentality’ is also relevant. This expression, combining 
government and rationality, notes that government depends on ways 
of knowing. Vocabularies of knowledge are constructed by powerful 
3.  As Simon (2005) has pointed out, the no-
tion of Panopticon has a dual focus. On the one 
hand, it depicts the story of a supervisor exerting 
control from a central tower. But it also depicts 
what happens to the prisoner, and in particular 
how self-discipline effects deep rooted internal 
change.  Consistent with this perspective, our 
notion of coercive persuasion also has a dual 
focus, emphasising the direct impact of obser-
vation and punishment, but also the attitudinal 
and behavioural transformations wrought by the 
enthusiastic internalisation of an ideology sanc-
tioned by powerful individuals.
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groups to establish their legitimacy. Various regulatory systems, forms 
of administration and knowledge mechanisms are therefore also em-
ployed to this end (Townley, 1993). It follows that knowledge forma-
tion is not neutral; rather, it is the contested end product of attempts 
by more or less powerful actors to establish their version of the truth. 
Totalising managerial discourses are therefore common (McKinlay and 
Starkey, 1998).
Consistent with this suggestion of conflict, we see coercive persua-
sion as a means of linking surveillance with intense indoctrination. Co-
ercive persuasion seeks to convince those at the receiving end that 
the sincere adoption of the designated belief systems is wholly con-
sistent with their own self interest. Such coercive persuasion arises 
from the recognition by both the persuader and the person being per-
suaded that legitimacy involves the degree to which an elite’s right to 
govern is recognised. Such recognition is more likely, as Courpasson 
(2000: 142) has argued, when ‘existing legitimate authority perpetu-
ates itself by incorporating soft practices and articulating these with 
hierarchical and formal bureaucratic practices.’ When organisational 
members embrace, either partially or completely, an ideological ori-
entation sanctioned by powerful leaders, it follows that the legitimacy 
of organisational structures, hierarchies and practices is more clearly 
established.
This perspective on coercive persuasion is also very much in line with 
traditional liberal conceptualisations of work (Sewell and Barker, 2006) 
that emphasize an employee’s needs to act in ways that benefit the 
greater organisation and its members.  Thus, adopting a designated 
belief system helps to stem the tendency, for example, toward slack-
ing, as the employee would experience an intense internal, but dis-
cursively created, drive to act in ways consistent with the needs of the 
organisation.  
While resistance certainly occurs, and doubts may be harboured, some 
will also find themselves ‘convinced’ by the type of coercive persua-
sion discussed in this paper. If this occurs, those concerned will be 
more likely to adopt a ‘converted’ mindset, and thus display zealous 
behaviours that are aligned with the belief system chosen for them 
by powerful others. Under these conditions, minimal external surveil-
lance may be required to ensure that behaviours consistent with the 
belief system are enacted. As Townley (1993: 520) notes, following 
Foucault, ‘power is not associated with a particular institution, but with 
practices, techniques and procedures’. Such a view avoids the wide-
spread conception of coercion as a process aimed at getting people to 
do what they would otherwise not want to; if, by contrast, they can be 
‘coercively persuaded’ by the deployment of various techniques into 
internalising a given ideology, they will be convinced that behaviours 
approved of by powerful organisational actors are actually undertaken 
of the subject’s own volition, rather than by force of command. How 
might such outcomes be achieved?  One answer begins with Schein’s 
(1961) early analysis of coercive persuasion, which, we argue, still has 
much relevance for our thinking today. 
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Schein’s Techniques of Coercive Persuasion 
The notion of coercive persuasion grew out of Schein’s study of US 
POWs detained in Korea in the 1950s4.  Their Chinese captors success-
fully convinced many of the POWs to internalise Communist beliefs, 
adopt an appropriate Communist identity, and show intense commit-
ment by adopting proselytising behaviours on behalf of the new belief 
system. Temporarily, many maintained their new belief system even 
after they were released from captivity (Taylor, 2004). On the basis of 
this quite remarkable outcome, Schein proposed that 
if a prisoner was physically restrained from leaving a situation in which learn-
ing was the only alternative, they would eventually learn through a process of 
‘cognitive redefinition’. They would eventually come to understand the point 
of view of the captor and reframe their own thinking so that the judgment of 
having been guilty became logical and acceptable. In effect they had under-
gone what might be called a ‘conversion’ experience except it did not happen 
in the sudden way that religious conversions are often described. (Schein, 
1961: 165)
This process is reminiscent of what has been dubbed ‘the Stockholm 
syndrome’ (Giebels et al., 2005) in which kidnap victims come to over-
identify with their kidnappers, resist rescue, refuse to testify against 
them in court or, as with the heiress turned revolutionary Patty Hearst 
(Watkins, 1976), adopt a new identity in keeping with the kidnappers’ 
value systems.  Clearly, as with the POWs in Schein’s study, kidnap 
victims are under intense physical and emotional stress. Some identify 
with their captors to minimise the omnipresent threat of violence. Since 
it is difficult to achieve any sense of perspective under these conditions, 
they may also invest the smallest act of kindness by their kidnappers 
with an importance out of proportion to the act itself5.  Coercive persua-
sion can reinforce a new group identity that, paradoxically, is shared 
with people who may previously have appeared to be in a position of 
polar opposition to the victim.
Schein identifies a variety of conditions that facilitate such outcomes. 
We summarise these in Exhibit 1 and rearticulate the techniques to 
express how they can become manifest in today’s organisations.  We 
then discuss the techniques in detail, paying particular attention to how 
these conditions link to contemporary corporate practices.
Table 1 : The Key Techniques of Coercive Persuasion
4.  His analysis is strikingly consistent with the 
contemporaneous work of Lifton (1961), who 
studied ‘thought reform’ programmes in China. 
Lifton also details similar mechanisms devoted 
to ‘re-education’, through the use of emotional 
appeals and confession rituals.
5.  Victims may also see rescue attempts as a 
threat, since the victims may be injured or killed 
during the attempt. This was precisely the fate 
of 344 civilians during the Beslan school siege 
in Russia in 2004.
Technique Schein’s Techniques from POW Experiences Modern Organisational Translation of Technique
1.  Reference Group Affiliation.
2.  Role Modelling.
3.  Peer Pressures.
Prisoners faced an indeterminate sentence.  This 
raised anxiety and created an impetus to affiliate with 
a new reference group as a means of reducing it.
Prisoners were placed with others who were more 
advanced in the learning process, who role mod-
elled ‘successful’ conformity and were rewarded for 
doing so. Prisoners were tempted to emulate their 
attitudes and behaviours to secure similar benefits.
Rewards were given only on a group basis, and 
only if all members of the group embraced the 
new point of view. This intensified peer pressure to 
conform.
Environmental changes, new entrants, and 
turnover create organisational anxiety.  We seek 
alignment with reference groups to reduce the 
anxiety and increase conformance.
Organisations develop systems of role modelling 
and mentoring so that members learn appropriate 
behaviour.  We learn from and come to emulate 
those in positions of power over us as we seek 
to meet their expectations, which increases 
conformity.
Focus on team working, shared rewards, and 
shared consequences intensifies peer pressure 
to conform.
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Technique Schein’s Techniques from POW Experiences Modern Organisational Translation of Technique
4.  Alignment of Identity.
5. Performance Assessment.
6.  Reward Systems.
7.  Communication Systems.
8.  Physical Pressure and Work Life Balance.
9.  Psychological Safety.
The new point of view was articulated repeatedly 
and in many forms. Repetition ensured that it 
eventually acquired a self-evident and eventually 
unchallengeable status.
Written confession and self-criticism became a 
regular activity, so that prisoners assessed past 
actions from a new point of view. Problems with 
the new belief system were viewed as examples of 
individual rather than systemic weaknesses.
Conformity attracted instant rewards. Signs of 
insincerity or limited understanding were punished. 
Conformist behaviours therefore increased while 
dissenting attitudes withered from lack of nourish-
ment.
Communications that in any way reinforced the 
old point of view or that reminded the prisoner of 
previous attachments were withheld or eliminated 
entirely. The past became ever more remote; the 
present acquired heightened power to shape at-
titudes, emotions and behaviours.
Physical pressures were constantly applied to 
weaken the prisoner’s physical strength, with sleep 
deprivation being the most potent of these pres-
sures; ‘torture’ was only used as a punishment for 
insincerity or lack of motivation to learn.
Psychological safety was produced for prisoners 
by fellow prisoners who were further along in their 
‘re-education’ and could be supportive of the target 
prisoner’s effort
Modern workers buy into the firm’s strategic 
vision and shape their behaviours accordingly.  
Conformity to the vision and values becomes part 
of our identity.
Employees are assessed based on their 
conformity with strategy and practice, including 
mechanisms such as 360-degree feedback.  As 
individuals, we are expected to conform and the 
system is assumed to be correct.
Conformists are rewarded. Dissent, such as 
whistle blowing or resistance, is sanctioned 
strongly.
Management and control of communication 
becomes central to the organisation.  Companies 
exert increased control of stakeholder information 
and management engagement with stakeholders.
Members are expected to work longer hours and 
expend greater effort as a means of demonstrat-
ing conformity and commitment.  Individuals are 
expected to demonstrate fortitude to overcome 
the physical demands of labour.
Psychological contracts become invested in 
expectations of conformity.  Mutual support of 
leaders creates both psychological safety and 
conformance.
1. Environmental changes, new entrants, and turnover create or-
ganisational anxiety.  
In order to reduce anxiety, individuals may seek to align themselves 
with reference groups. The effect of this process is to increase con-
formity.  In Schein’s study, the POWs’ only hope of redemption and 
release was when they made a confession that their captors judged 
to be sincere. This was a powerful incentive for conformity and an 
equally powerful punishment for dissent. Clearly, corporations are not 
POW camps. Nevertheless, employees frequently face management 
demands for conformity and the internalisation of belief systems sym-
pathetic to corporate values. An example is Barker’s (1993: 431-432) 
jarring account of forced confession and redemptive acceptance of 
conformity in peer work groups.  Of course, like the POWs, we do have 
the option of concealed resistance such as by pretending towards a 
sincere, penitent and converted mindset. However, performances of 
this kind contain their own hazards. As Goffman (1959: 28) stresses, 
‘one finds that the performer can be fully taken in by his own act; he can 
be sincerely convinced that the impression of reality which he stages is 
the real reality.’ In any event, coercive persuasion seeks to produce a 
genuine desire for conformity rather than its facsimile. Pressure alone 
is unlikely to have such an impact. Rather, a process of enculturation is 
also required. How is this likely to be achieved?
The key lies in the emulation of conformist rituals that are common-
place in organisations. For example, Kunda (1992) demonstrates, in 
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an ethnographic study of a hi-tech American corporation, how such ritu-
als are developed by leaders to inculcate the ‘right beliefs’ and produce 
an ‘acceptable’ organisational identity. Employees may then play along 
with these rituals, rather than reveal what might be described as a ‘bad 
attitude.’ But this also renders employees liable to internalise the values 
behind the rituals, even if they have initially resisted them. In essence, 
like a method actor over preparing a part, the person internalises a role 
to such an extent that they become indistinguishable from their perform-
ance. It is likely that many of the POWs in Schein’s study embarked on 
a similar course of action, only to find that their dissimulation gradually 
eroded pre-existing beliefs and helped install new values and codes of 
conduct in their place. Tourish and Vatcha (2005) have argued that this 
dynamic within Enron helps to explain the enthusiastic and seemingly 
genuine commitment by many of its employees to its internal rituals and 
to what ultimately proved to be its self-destructive beliefs. 
2.  Organisations develop systems of role modelling and mentor-
ing so that members learn appropriate behaviour. 
This provides the subjects of coercive persuasion with role models and 
socially legitimised identities to emulate.  In Schein’s study, prisoners 
could also see at first hand the rewards attached to adopting the pre-
scribed organisational identity of ‘the good Communist’ and to demon-
strating high levels of commitment through the enthusiastic display of 
behaviours consistent with their new identity. This dynamic is consistent 
with social identity theory, which asserts that individuals identify them-
selves with respect to various group memberships and tend to classify 
others into one or more categories (e.g. ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’) in 
order to identify similarities and differences (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). It 
is also seen in Barker’s (1993) description of placing new team mem-
bers with longer-tenured members for ‘proper’ socialisation. Individuals 
establish a positive social identity and confirm association by show-
ing preference to members of their own social category. As Jost and 
Elsbach (2001: 183) argued, ‘we derive a great deal of personal value 
and meaning from our group memberships, so that our self-concepts 
depend in significant ways upon the ways in which our groups are re-
garded by ourselves and by others’, a point echoed in the organisa-
tional identification literature (e.g. Tompkins and Cheney, 1983).
In the case of the POWs, more long standing members of the group 
would have appeared as experienced survivors and hence as positive 
role models. Following Tompkins and Cheney (1985), identifying with 
their behaviours, and subsequently internalising their attitudes would 
have been logical survival behaviour, helping to forge a new group 
identity of considerable value and strength. 
More broadly, scholars have argued that the power of leaders in so-
called ‘high demand’ groups increases as a result of the identity re-
lated benefits accruing from conformity that are provided by other group 
members (Baron et al., 2003). Acceptance by the members of such 
groups feels gratifying to those joining it, increasing the desire to affili-
ate. But affiliation is dependent on the acceptance and eventual inter-
nalisation of the norms within the group concerned, an acceptance that, 
in a punitive and disorienting environment, feels attractive because it 
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reduces uncertainty about what to think, feel and do (Hogg, 2001). 
Thus, if we accept that people are attracted by the idea of order, then 
the embrace of ideological commitment offers many attractions. A com-
prehensive belief system can appear to explain the world and the place 
of the individual within it. Under conditions of stress and uncertainty, 
ideological totalism of this kind may become more alluring, especially if 
people’s need for security increases. Such dynamics reinforce leader 
power since the leaders define norms of behaviour and ideology, and 
thus set the parameters within which acceptance or exclusion from the 
valued group is likely to occur. In a similar way, new recruits to corpo-
rate organisations are typically predisposed to follow more established 
employees, whose longevity suggests they are familiar with organisa-
tional belief systems and their associated rituals of conformity.
3.  Focus on team working, shared rewards, and shared conse-
quences intensifies peer pressure to conform.  
A number of general group theories point toward the potential impact 
of this technique. As the Milgram (1974) and Asch (1951) experiments 
demonstrated, we are strongly inclined to act on the basis of authority 
and to change our behaviours to be more consistent with those of other 
group members, particularly when members of the group have a higher 
status than we do. In the case of the POWs in Korea, rewards were 
dependent on compliance. Those already inclined toward compliance 
were thereby provided with a tremendous incentive to increase their 
pressure on the rest. Given their already strong tendency to conform 
to the emergent group norms, this additional pressure created an even 
more powerful context for conversion. It also provided an incentive for 
at least some group members to engage in the surveillance of their fel-
lows in an expression of what Foucault (1977; 1982) regarded as disci-
plinary power. Such surveillance enforces norms of behaviour among 
all parties to a social interaction (Sewell and Barker, 2006), ensuring 
that alternative forms of being and doing are pushed to the margins 
of the group’s tightly policed activities and consciousness (Lacombe, 
1996).
Thus, in a parallel process, workplace surveillance systems increas-
ingly seek to produce conformist (i.e. compliant and pliant) individuals 
in the workplace. The growing emphasis on teamwork is an important 
mechanism for unleashing similar dynamics in the form of peer pres-
sure (Barker, 1993). Many such systems use group-based incentives 
and rewards, as well as other mechanisms, to create powerful sys-
tems of peer pressure. In Foucault’s terms, these processes illustrate 
the disciplinary effects of power and identity and the barriers they can 
create for resistance (McKinlay and Taylor, 1996). Corporate culture 
initiatives (Kunda, 1992), performance assessment systems (Townley, 
1994), and information gathering systems (Zuboff, 1988) have all been 
explored in ways consistent with our view of coercive persuasion.  For 
example, Mehri’s (2006) study of the lean production system at Toyota 
contrasted the official company rhetoric with a more coercive reality 
noting that ‘Employees are expected to follow all rules and obey the 
prescribed code of behaviour that exists at the company’ (Mehri, 2006: 
26). Researchers have argued that such approaches seek to regu-
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late, discipline and control employee selves, while camouflaging such 
intentions in the more benign rhetoric of family values and empower-
ment (Martin, 1999). Culture, in such contexts, becomes another form 
of social control (Willmott, 1993; 2003), regardless of the emancipatory 
rhetoric through which it may be expressed. 
4. Modern workers buy into the firm’s strategic vision and shape 
their behaviours accordingly. 
Repeated presentations give any vision multiple advantages. Firstly, 
research into influence and persuasion suggests that we are inclined 
to believe that whatever is repeated is more likely to be true (Cialdini, 
2001). Secondly, in the example of Korea, when presentations were of-
fered by authority figures in whom the prisoners had some confidence 
(in particular, by fellow prisoners who were further along in the conver-
sion process), they were even more inclined to give the message undue 
credence. The perceived expertise (Bohner et al., 2002) and trustwor-
thiness (Di Blasi, 2003) of the person articulating the message added 
enormously to its potency. Moreover, the message itself was presented 
as if it articulated a set of self evident, scientific, and unchallengeable 
truths, much in the same manner as the reality of corporate power often 
cloaks itself in a rhetoric of personal liberation (e.g. Peters, 1992) and 
‘the end of history’ (Fukuyama, 1993) today. Communist ideology was 
presented to the prisoners in highly selective generalities emphasising 
human liberation. Such an appeal to a wider social interest is a regu-
larly used means of ensuring that domination acquires the trappings of 
legitimacy rendering the internalisation of a given ideology much more 
attractive (Miller, 1989). 
Likewise, corporate ideology fixes on such questions as competitive 
success for the company, the notion of unitary interests between corpo-
rate owners and employees, and the blissful future which the success 
of the corporation will ensure for all those fortunate enough to affiliate 
with it. The internalisation of such messages, should it occur, confers 
advantages on those who have developed them, and whose interests 
they serve. As Townley (1993: 519) in applying a Foucauldian perspec-
tive to management issues, writes, ‘what counts as truth depends on, 
or is determined by, the conceptual system in operation.’ The repeated 
articulation of what may be viewed as contentious corporate ideologies 
seeks to reshape the conceptual systems of employees, thereby rein-
forcing their acceptance of and devotion to particular ideals.
5. Members are assessed based on their conformity with strategy 
and practice. 
Criticism and self-criticism in a group context is a powerful tool of disci-
pline and conversion (Baron, 2000) and was widely used in Korea. Such 
self-criticism has been extensively and more broadly documented as 
an approach used by leaders of organisations that emphasise extreme 
forms of conformity and compliance (Lalich, 2004). Group members are 
bombarded with monotonous and simplified messages, shorn of all am-
biguity and uncertainty. Criticism and self-criticism sessions establish 
that any difficulties perceived with the message, or in its implementation, 
arise from followers’ insufficient compliance and devotion rather than 
from weaknesses in either the message or the overall social system. 
370
Manufacturing Conformity : 
Leadership Through Coercive Persuasion in Business Organisations
M@n@gement vol. 12 no. 4, 2009, 360-383
This in turn erodes people’s confidence in whatever critical perceptions 
they hold prior to joining the group, and increases their dependence on 
the group and its leader for ‘guidance, interpretation, explanation and 
normative control over activity and choices’ (Baron et al., 2003: 173). Ap-
proval from such leaders depends on ever greater levels of conformity. 
Even if the belief is not fully internalised, a person hearing nothing but 
a one-note message is eventually likely to be compelled to draw from 
it when expressing their own opinions (Tourish, 1998). The more pub-
lic people’s statements in support of a new belief become, the more 
likely it is that their internal views will shift to be consistent with their 
external behaviours (Cialdini, 2001). When our views shift far enough 
from their starting position, the outcome can be defined as conversion. 
Moreover, once enough people internalise an ‘appropriate’ attitude, this 
may produce organisational contexts reminiscent of what Aldous Huxley 
described in Brave New World as a ‘really efficient totalitarian state’; that 
is, one ‘in which the all-powerful executive of political bosses and their 
army of managers controls a population of slaves who do not have to be 
coerced, because they love their servitude’ (Huxley, 2004: xxxv).
We find plentiful corporate parallels. Appraisal systems are commonly 
used not just to monitor performance, but also ‘to foster identification 
with corporate goals and objectives and inculcate organisational stand-
ards’ (Fairhurst, 2007: 83). Individuals are permanently on show, and 
their performance and attitudes are subject to examination. Some ap-
praisal systems go much further, and seek to identify ‘poor’ performers 
for dismissal (so-called ‘rank and yank’ systems), thereby activating in-
ternal dynamics very similar to the criticism and self criticism processes 
identified by Schein (Tourish and Vatcha, 2005). Managers are required 
to identify lots of problems with behaviours, levels of commitment and 
attitudes. Employees are then required to ‘confess’ their weaknesses 
and agree action plans to resolve them in order to survive the culling 
process. The focus here also tends to be on individual failings rather 
than systemic weaknesses, an emphasis which creates further pressure 
towards conformity and conversion, while minimising the scope for pro-
ductive dissent. 
6. Conformists are rewarded, dissent, such as whistle blowing or 
resistance, is sanctioned strongly. 
Again, reinforcement theory demonstrates that rewards have a potent 
effect in shaping behaviour (Hargie and Dickson, 2004). When people 
experience rewards for conformity and punishment for resistance, the 
volume of dissent will likely diminish while the clamour of conformist 
opinion will increase (Kassing, 2001). There is abundant evidence 
that the penalising of dissent has become an organisational norm, 
with a consequent increase in ingratiating behaviours on the part of 
employees (principally overt, enthusiastic and excessive agreement 
with the ideas propounded by leaders and managers) utilised as a 
means of both surviving and trying to acquire influence over manag-
ers (Tourish and Robson, 2006). In short, it is increasingly normal 
within the corporate milieu for people to find their dissenting options 
significantly restricted while their ingratiating/conformist behaviours 
are rewarded. 
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7. Management and control of communication becomes central to 
the organisation. 
In Korea, the captors’ intention was to cut people adrift from previously 
influential sources of information and to ensure that only information 
consistent with the new world view penetrated their social environment. 
By heightening interaction within the prisoner’s new reference group, 
the potential influence of those within the group on shaping new at-
titudes was also significantly strengthened. 
In the business world today, the issue of identity construction is gener-
ally ‘closely tied up with the ways organisations organise their “world” 
in terms of communication’ (Cheney and Christensen, 2001: 241). This 
emphasis on identity heightens concern with the management of inter-
nal and external communication and with controlling the boundaries be-
tween them. The management and control of communication is central 
to the building of organisational culture through the creation of symbols 
and the performances by which they are transmitted to and then in-
ternalised by employees (Weeks and Galunic, 2003). Communication, 
rather than merely ‘carrying’ information, can thus come to be viewed 
as a process which has a power to constitute organisations, rather than 
merely represent them (Kuhn, 2008). It follows that some discourses 
are typically more privileged than others. Recognising this, and the op-
portunities it affords to constrain and define reality for others, leaders 
and managers can place restrictions on the communicative activities of 
employees (e.g. by monitoring personal email traffic/internet access), 
insist on residential training courses during which communication with 
families and others is discouraged, and prohibit attendees from travel-
ling home until the training has been completed.
8. Members are expected to work longer hours and expend greater 
effort as a means of demonstrating conformity and commitment.  In 
the Korean context, this technique deprived POWs of the physical and 
emotional reserves required for effective resistance. It also heightened 
tension, thus rendering them more susceptible to messages or a new 
ideology that promised to relieve them of their growing sense of vulner-
ability. Such pressure rendered non-compliance costly, a major means 
by which coercion can shape behaviours, attitudes and emotions (Hau-
gaard, 1997). Of course, most employees never face anything quite 
so dramatic. But they do face the intensification of work brought to an 
extreme in organisations such as GE, Microsoft, and the late, lamented 
example of Enron, in which 70-hour work weeks and above were com-
mon.  Although unlikely to be as intense as those felt by the POWs, the 
psychological effects may nevertheless be similar in kind.
9. Psychological contracts become invested in expectations of 
conformity. 
Ultimately, ‘redemption’ was depicted to the POWs in Korea as an easy 
choice. It was rendered all the more attractive by the existence of ready 
made role models who offered support and rewards to those former 
recalcitrants now embarking on a journey similar to their own. Above all, 
surrender was depicted as a capitulation to bliss. This process recalls the 
climax of George Orwell’s novel, 1984, in which a tearful Winston Smith 
finally ‘wins’ the battle over himself: he now really loves Big Brother.
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Again, there are many organisational parallels. Teams are commonly 
constructed with a mixture of experienced and inexperienced mem-
bers. One of their key tasks is the socialisation and acculturation of 
new team members (Katzenbach and Smith, 1992). Mentoring is also 
used to achieve the same effect. Employees with mentors have been 
found to ‘learn the ropes’ faster than those without (Wilson and Elman, 
1990). Of course, in a non-coercive environment this may be entirely 
benign. But in organisations in which leaders and managers are seek-
ing to impose an all-encompassing ideology and constricting behav-
ioural norms on others, mentoring and team-work may simply become 
another means of exercising concertive control.
The nine techniques derived from Schein’s famous study provide a 
useful mechanism for engaging and assessing the force of coercive 
persuasion in modern organisations, as we can readily see how the 
techniques strongly encourage conformity.  Below, we will apply this 
framework to explore the manifestation of these techniques in the 
growth of corporate culturalism.
Coercive Persuasion, Organisations and Corporate 
Culturism
As we have been careful to note, the imprisonment of US POWs in 
Korea clearly does not exactly parallel the context of most contempo-
rary organisations. Their detention is closer to the experience of being 
confined within what Foucault (1977) termed ‘carceral institutions’ and 
Goffman (1968) named  ‘total institutions’, forms of organisation such 
as prisons or asylums that exist in partitioned space and time sepa-
rated off from the rest of the world. Problematising Foucault’s gener-
alisation of the very tight control of incarcerating institutions to other 
forms of organisation, Giddens (1984, 1987) argues that discipline 
in contemporary capitalist organisations is not entirely analogous to 
carceral institutions. He suggests that in capitalist society, the separa-
tion of the home from work is a key characteristic of the time-space 
zoning of modernity. Emphasising the importance to employees of ‘free 
time’ from capitalist organisations, Giddens contends that individuals 
will conform at work, ‘usually as a trade-off for rewards that derive from 
being freed from such discipline at other times’ (1984: 154). Giddens 
insisted that control in less all-embracing organisations is more subtle, 
utilising methods to produce collaboration and compliance rather than 
the coercive control of the ‘total institution’6.  
However, other researchers question this view, highlighting the con-
siderable influence of organisations even on our ‘personal’ time and 
space. Burrell (1988) contends that ‘as individuals, we are incarcerated 
within an organisational world. Thus, whilst we may not live in total in-
stitutions, the institutional organisation of our lives is total’ (1988: 232; 
see also Tompkins and Cheney’s, 1985, discussion of unobtrusive con-
trol). Exploring the impact of career projects on the lives of UK account-
ants, Grey (1994) reveals how aspiring and conformist individuals tend 
to treat all organisational and even personal relations as a means to 
the end of career progress. As he suggests, the concern with career 
‘links home and work, leisure, and past, present and future through 
6. Goffman (1968) did recognise the impor-
tance of organisational surveillance, the op-
positional nature of inmates’ responses and its 
close connections to identity. He argued that 
within the ‘underlife’ of TIs, inmates resisted the 
organisational definition of what they should 
be doing and who they should be by engaging 
in ‘secondary adjustments’. These forbidden 
ways of ‘working the system’ demonstrated ‘to 
the practitioner if no one else- that he (sic) has 
some selfhood and personal autonomy beyond 
the grasp of the organisation’ (Goffman 1968: 
275-6). 
373
Dennis Tourish, David Collinson, James R. Barker M@n@gement vol. 12 no. 4, 2009, 360-383
the vector of the self’. Non-work lives become totally subordinated to 
the pursuit of a career with friends, who are gradually re-defined as 
‘contacts,’ while the social life is reduced to the instrumental activity 
of ‘networking’. Suggesting that career projects construct individuals 
as highly disciplined subjects, Grey concludes that ‘the project of self-
management might be said to consist of the construction of our lives as 
total institutions’ (1994: 481)7.  
Suffice it to say here that, while we acknowledge significant differ-
ences between the case of the POWs in Korea and the experience of 
working in capitalist organisations, we also highlight interesting over-
laps between these contexts. Many contemporary organisations now 
encourage their employees to think of their work as a way of life, a 
cause, a movement, even a ‘religion’ and, ultimately, a crusade instead 
of being merely a job. For leaders and managers who seek to generate 
employee commitment rather than formal compliance, thought reform 
(realised by means of coercive persuasion) may seem a highly desir-
able process. The outcome is likely to be an environment dominated 
by what has been described as ‘bounded choice’ (Lalich, 2004); that is, 
one in which the expression of only a limited and tightly regulated reper-
toire of beliefs, behaviours, and emotions is permissible. Paradoxically, 
employees may embrace such environments in an attempt to reduce 
uncertainty and anxiety and in pursuit of a heightened sense of greater 
purpose. In the process, however, they are required to engage in ever 
more extreme acts of self-renunciation, involving the subordination of 
important personal norms to those of the group.
Connecting this issue once again to organisational surveillance and the 
work of Foucault, it is worth recalling his description of the intended ef-
fects of the Panopticon: 
…to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that 
assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the 
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; 
that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnec-
essary…in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of 
which they themselves are the bearers. (Foucault, 1977: 201).
We argue that the techniques of coercive persuasion are likely to pro-
duce a similar effect through creating an environment in which an of-
ficially sanctioned ideology is internalised by subjects. In such contexts, 
ideology serves as a source of conscious and permanent scrutiny, func-
tioning as an invisible internal eye, which holds the behaviour of the 
subject to the ideology’s exacting standards and ensures that subjects 
themselves become the instruments through which their own subordi-
nation is exercised.
Thus, efforts at coercive persuasion start with the articulation of an ide-
ology which people are required to endorse enthusiastically, publicly, 
and often. Ideology in corporate organisations is increasingly ‘rooted in 
[a] sense of mission associated with charismatic leadership, developed 
through traditions and sagas and then reinforced through identifications’ 
(Mintzberg, 1989: 223). Cheerleading rituals are crucial to a mission’s 
internalisation by organisational members, as is the threat of isolation 
for defiance. In particular, the increasing interest in strong corporate 
cultures and in the development of associated ‘visions’ represents a 
7. These debates about time-space relations 
and whether the home can be considered an 
area of ‘free’ time and space have also tended 
to neglect or underestimate a central contribu-
tion of feminist analysis over the past twenty 
years, namely that domestic work often consti-
tutes unfree time and space for women and a 
source of power for men (e.g. Zaretsky 1976).
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form of ideological development and underpins contemporary proc-
esses of coercive persuasion. Many management development pro-
grammes are expressly designed to produce what can be described as 
conversion on the part of managers, through the adoption of corporate 
evangelism, in order to convert people into ‘True Believers’ in the des-
ignated belief system (Turnbull, 2001). The rhetoric of self discovery, 
faith and commitment (more often associated with religious environ-
ments) is often employed to engage people in an emotional quest for 
a new identity sympathetic to corporate goals (Ackers and Preston, 
1997). In the context of asymmetrical power relationships, such rheto-
ric can easily have a coercive undertone. 
Accordingly, what has been defined as ‘corporate culturism’ frequently 
[…] aspires to extend management control by colonising the affective 
domain – the hearts as well as the minds of employees – in an innovative, 
oppressive and paradoxical manner – by claiming to extend their practical 
autonomy […]. The implicit intent of corporate culturism […] is to establish 
monocultures in which choices and decisions are made within a normative 
framework of core values that are established, or at least sanctioned, by 
management. (Willmott, 2003: 75) 
It is frequently assumed that core organisational values must take pri-
ority over all other values. This viewpoint is often expressed in the au-
thoritarian language of those in senior positions, intended to intimidate 
and reframe individual identity within a narrow corporatist paradigm. 
The following quotation is taken from an e-mail sent by Neal Patterson, 
then CEO of Cerner Corporation (a major US healthcare software de-
velopment company), to his line managers:
We are getting less than 40 hours of work from a large number of our […] EM-
PLOYEES […]. The parking lot is sparsely used at 8a.m.; likewise at 5p.m […]. 
NEVER in my career have I allowed a team which worked for me to think they 
had a 40-hour job […]. I STRONGLY recommend that you call some 7a.m., 
6p.m. and Saturday a.m. team meetings […]. My measurement will be the 
parking lot […]. The pizza man should show up at 7.30p.m. to feed the starving 
teams working late (Cited by Wong, 2001: 1 – emphasis in the original).
Such pressure on staff to work longer and longer hours, coupled with 
surveillance (the parking-lot metric), illustrates how corporate leaders 
can coercively persuade employees to privilege (paid) work above eve-
rything else (see also Collinson and Collinson, 2004). The discourse, 
in the example given, is clearly one of surveillance, measurement, and 
compulsion: an attempt to construct the leader as a subject of power 
and employees as its compliant objects.
Alternative discourses to those of corporate culturism tend to be viewed 
as deficient and disposable (Willmott, 1993). Corporate culturism cre-
ates a struggle for a new identity and a conflict with whatever old ones 
get in the way (du Gay, 1991). The ideal state is assumed to be one 
of employee devotion to corporate goals and values. It has long been 
clear that one of the main tactics for dealing with people’s sense of am-
bivalence in the face of management power has been to depict corpo-
rate life as being much freer than it really is (Hoopes, 2003). In this con-
text, the compulsory engagement we are highlighting is often couched 
in the language of empowerment, and liberation. Fundamentally, this 
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discursive framing represents a ‘systematic and totalising approach to 
the design and strengthening of the normative framework of work’ (du 
Gay, 1991:  524 – emphasis in the original). 
Coercive persuasion is rooted in the imbalance of power between key 
organisational actors and reproduced through the emphasis on follow-
ers’ identity. In contemporary corporations coercive persuasion is fre-
quently facilitated by the compelling and ‘positive’ visions of leaders 
seeking to attract the enthusiastic support of employees (e.g. Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982; 1999; Collins and Porras, 1995). Visions have been 
defined as a set of beliefs about how people should act and interact 
to attain some idealised future state (Strange and Mumford, 2002). 
They are intended to establish cultures that rest on uniform values, 
beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours and in which alternative discourses 
are marginalised and suppressed. As Maccoby (2003: 229) has written 
with specific reference to the US, the public has been ‘seduced by the 
promise of visionary leaders’. Given that people want work with some 
social meaning or social value, want to feel part of a larger community, 
and want to live and work in an integrated fashion (Pfeffer, 2003), their 
tendency to comply is hardly surprising. 
Underlying these positive visions, leaders and managers typically make 
all-important organisational decisions. In practice, they retain the power 
to reward and punish, to define strategic direction, and to withdraw the 
empowerment initiatives upon which they embark. Organisational influ-
ence sharing has therefore made remarkably little progress over the 
past fifty years (Heller, 1998). Coercion thus remains an endemic char-
acteristic of the leader-follower, management-employee relationship. 
By extending leaders’ and managers’ power into the affective domain, 
corporate culturism promotes a mono-culture in the workplace (at least 
as the ideal) and significantly limits dissent. The intent often appears 
to be to activate intense commitment on the part of employees as a 
means of heightening work effort, productivity and profitability. 
Within this world-view, senior managers are encouraged to influence 
every area of their employees’ lives, including their behaviour at work, 
their attitudes towards the organisation, and increasingly their most pri-
vate values and belief systems as evidenced by a growing interest on 
the part of many corporations and chief executives in promoting ‘spir-
ituality’ in the workplace (e.g. Bell and Taylor, 2001; 2004; Fry, 2003; 
Duchan and Plowman, 2005). As the quotation from Kunda and Cun-
ningham (1999) cited at the beginning of this paper suggests, the intent 
appears to be to render behaviour consistent with the needs of the 
corporation, always and everywhere. 
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have examined the important dynamics of coercive 
persuasion and discussed how these dynamics, shaped through lead-
ership control practices, can come to manufacture employee conform-
ity and minimize dissent within contemporary organisations. In a sense, 
we have used Schein’s (1961) framework to cast a new light on the 
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subtle but essential and powerful process through which our individual 
‘I’s’ become functional corporate ‘we’s’ (Burke, 1937: 140). Given the 
argument that ‘power is relational because it reveals itself in its applica-
tion with others vis-à-vis specific practices, techniques, or procedures’ 
(Fairhurst, 2007: 81), we have sought to illuminate how coercive power 
can be expressed in organisations, through a series of practices aimed 
at combining surveillance with the internalisation of particular ideolo-
gies deemed to be acceptable, and therefore more likely to produce 
the ‘appropriate individual’. We have used Schein’s (1961) early work 
on ‘coercive persuasion’ as a framework through which to identify and 
assess such persuasion and then argued that contemporary corporate 
attempts to sustain employee conformity through coercive persuasion 
are informed by the exercise of particular forms of control that invoke 
specific (legitimised) identities. In such cases dissent tends to be de-
fined as disloyalty and punished, while conformity is rewarded. These 
tensions may be especially pronounced in particular kinds of organisa-
tions. As Gordon et al (2009) have noted, such organisations as po-
lice forces play a distinctly coercive role in society, and many have 
struggled with the legacy of their quasi-military past. In short, where a 
tradition of hierarchy and obeying orders is particularly marked, those 
who belong may be attracted to or affected by the articulation of strong 
cultural values and the mechanisms of coercive persuasion discussed 
in this article.
Nevertheless, we believe that the issues discussed here have a much 
wider application. We have therefore connected our discussion to the 
literature on organisational surveillance, and to Foucault’s influential 
work on disciplinary processes within prisons, with a particular focus 
on his discussion of the Panopticon. This literature focuses on ‘the 
few watching the many’ (Sewell and Barker, 2006: 935), and therefore 
conceives of organisational control in terms of powerful individuals ex-
erting control over relatively powerless ones. But however insightful 
much of this literature is, it cannot fully account for all the conformist 
behaviours that we witness daily in organisations and that occur in the 
absence of constant surveillance. We have not argued that the tech-
niques of coercive persuasion are likely to achieve such a totalitarian 
impact either and have acknowledged the forms of resistance that are 
also found in most organisations. To take one example, some scholars 
have claimed that call centres could be viewed as instances of perfect 
panoptic surveillance (Fernie and Metcalf, 1999). Yet detailed studies 
have demonstrated that resistance, both overt and covert, is a daily oc-
currence (e.g. Bain and Taylor, 2000). Thus, there is no perfect Panop-
ticon, or other forms of social control that can infallibly regulate human 
behaviour (Simon, 2005).
Despite this, coercive persuasion seeks to combine both explicit forms 
of surveillance and intense indoctrination, in order to ensure that those 
at its receiving end are more likely to internalise dominant ideologi-
cal norms as their own. Such ‘thought reform’ (Lifton, 1961) reduces 
the need for surveillance, since if people embrace a particular belief 
system and the norms that are associated with it, they can guide their 
behaviour in desired directions with minimal external oversight. While 
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Schein studied this phenomenon in a particularly coercive context, we 
have argued that these coercive persuasion techniques are still found 
in a modern corporate context, and thus warrant our understanding and 
critique. Schein (1961) himself drew attention to similarities between 
the techniques he was exploring and their use in other contexts such 
as religious orders, prisons, educational institutions, and mental hospi-
tals. But he also recognised that these methods only exerted an effect 
in some cases due to the interaction between the techniques and such 
factors as individual predisposition, innate interest in whatever ideology 
was being promoted, and social context (Introvigne, 2002).  Hence, 
the outcome of compliance and conversion is partially determined by 
the content of the ideology in question as well as by the specific tech-
niques that are employed in its promotion. The general dominance of 
and unquestioning attitude towards a managerial or pro-business ideol-
ogy in today’s society would suggest that when techniques of coercive 
persuasion are employed in a corporate context, they may be operating 
within a particularly fruitful environment since the techniques will be 
building upon attitudes that are already at least partially in place. 
Thus, we argue that the notion of coercive persuasion represents an 
under-utilised analytic lens through which to study power, conformity, 
and resistance in organisations.  The application of the nine techniques 
in Schein’s framework provides a model for engaging and interrogating 
both the pull toward and the possibility of resistance against (Zoller and 
Fairhurst, 2007) conformity in modern organisations.  This article has 
suggested that, by focusing on the behavioural aspects embedded in 
Schein’s framework, we can gain a more sophisticated and useful un-
derstanding of how coercive persuasion in contemporary organisations 
can shape and direct subordinate behaviour and identity.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, all groups and organisations must share some norms of be-
haviour and have some agreement about the vision they are seeking 
to achieve; otherwise, they would be incapable of functioning. How-
ever, when the norms and vision in question become all-embracing in 
their scope and particularly when they prohibit critical discussion, they 
can facilitate the harmful exercise of manipulative and coercive control 
by leaders and managers. Coercive persuasion seeks to sidestep the 
challenge of followers’ autonomy and resistance by convincing those in 
subordinate positions that what is on offer is in their real best interest. 
Its message is that people should embrace an organisational identity 
set for them by their leaders, display enthusiastic commitment in sup-
port of organisational goals, and adopt conformist behaviours that have 
been centrally sanctioned, while avoiding any behaviour likely to be 
regarded as ‘deviant’.  
Individual identity is a fluid and multi-faceted construct formed in the con-
text of conformity and resistance (Collinson 2003). People do not enter 
organisational life with an immutable identity which they either uphold 
in an organic ‘pure’ form or which they collapse into whatever shape is 
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dictated to them by powerful others. Identity is always relational: ‘one 
can only ever be seen to be something in relation to something else’ 
(Clegg, 1989: 159). A creative process of struggle, therefore, unfolds 
in which neither the agents of influence nor their subjects remain fixed 
in time or space, but in which they exert a reciprocal influence on the 
other (Shamir, 2007). Accordingly, we would stress that these process-
es of coercive persuasion and of employee conformity are themselves 
characterised by numerous ambiguities, inconsistencies, tensions, and 
contradictions, which in turn can produce counter-productive effects as 
well as the possibility of organisational change. 
Nevertheless, given the constraints imposed on dissent, employee 
conformity in contemporary organisations is often more evident than 
resistance. Drawing on Schein’s model, this paper has critically ex-
amined leadership practices designed to reinforce employee conform-
ity via coercive persuasion. Many of these practices have become so 
widespread and ‘normal’ as to assume an unchallenged status in the 
minds of organisational actors, and we have highlighted several prob-
lems that this ‘normality’ is likely to create. More critical studies of the 
dynamics of coercive persuasion in everyday life are clearly required.
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